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CHAPTER ONE 
LBADERSHIP AT THE ONSET OF' THE CIVIL WAR 
The southern state of South Carolina seceded from the 
Union in December 1860, after the election of Abraham Lincoln 
to the presidency of the United States. By February 1861, she 
was joined by six other states; later four more followed, 
making eleven in all. Their total population was about nine 
million, while that of the twenty-three states remaining loyal 
to the Union was something over twenty million. 1 
Fort Sumter, built in a routine way to adorn the coast 
of a country that never expected to go to war, stood at the 
precise spot where the hurricane was going to break. 2 
At daybreak on the morning of April 12, 1861, General 
P. G. T. Beauregard began open hostilities by firing on Fort 
Sumter in Charleston Harbor. It is interesting to note that 
Jefferson Davis might have sent a cargo of provisions to Fort 
Sumter and invited its garrison to remain as guests of the 
Confederacy. Had he done this he might have won the sympathy 
1Colin R. Ballard: The Militar 1952. Oxford University ~P-r_e_s_s_ ........ L~o--n~d~o-n-.~.,..,,..~~~~~.,..,-----,..-------.......... -
hereafter as Ballard. 
2 Bruce Catton:This Hallowed Ground. 1956. Doubleday and 
Co., Inc. Garden City, New York. p. i4. Cited hereafter as 
Catton, This Hallowed Ground. 
2 
of many pacifists in the North. His act would have kept him 
right in the eyes of foreigners, and most certainly it would 
I 
~ave embarrassed Lincoln, who could neither withdraw his 
garrison nor leave it there under such conditions.3 
Thus it came that Lincoln, who of all men hated war, was 
the one man on whose shoulders fell the responsibility for 
conducting the greatest civil war known. Called to the head 
of our nation in the hour of crisis, Lincoln had neither 
experience in administration nor any idea of military strategy, 
yet he was forced to assume control of both.4 Ignorant of war, 
he wanted to use the knowledge of one who was supposed to be 
a master of the art. President Lincoln approached General 
Winfield Scott, the ancient warrior, with grateful humility. 
He requested a daily report of the military situation. Scott 
started sending the reports immediately and continued to do 
so for weeks. 5 
Thus it was General Scott who becSll'le the first head of 
the army for the Union cause in 1861. This army at the out-
break of hostilities numbered about 16,000 men. Of the 1200 
officers that had been trained at West Point, about one third 
were Southerners, and, with few exceptions, loyally supported 
the South. With so few qualified officers available, Lincoln 
3Ballard, pp. 28-29. 
4Ballard, pp. 33-36. 
5T. Harry Williams: Lincoln~ His Generals. 1952. 
Alfred A. Knopf. New York. p. 15. Cited hereafter as Willia.ms. 
6Ballard, p. 46. 
3 
necessarily made numerous ooli ti cal apoointments to am.bi tious 
political chieftains with large personal followings, especially 
if they were Democrats. Among these were John A. Logan, Nathaniel 
B. Banks, John A. McClernand, and good ole Ben Butler. These 
selections saddled the army with some prize incompetents in 
high places, but they were good investments in national 
cohesion.7 
General Scott was old and nearly senile; he was too fat 
and infirm to mount a horse or even to review his troops. All 
he could offer the government was his great reputation and his 
stout old heart.8 However, the general was able enough to see 
the overall aspect of the war and the importance of the occu-
pation of the Mississippi line. He suggested that a defensive 
uosition should be established around Washington while the 
. 
main effort was made in the West.9 Of General Scott's tenure 
as military chief, one good thing can be said. Upon his recommen-
dation Henry W. Halleck was appointed directly a Major General 
and assigned to the department of the Missouri. In July 1862, 
he was promoted to general-in-chief of the armies of the United 
States. At that time he we.s transrerred to Wash1ngton where he 
directed the movements of the generals in the field. He was 
71,villiams, p. 11. 
BBruce Catton: Mr. Lincoln's 
Co., Inc. Garden City';-New York. 
Catton, Mr. Lincoln's Army. 
cBallard, p. 175. 
Armv. 1951. Doubleday and 
;-:--1.;o. Cited hereafte.r> 8S 
4 
superseded by the appointment of General Grant in March 1864.lO 
The fighting had hardly started, yet the most momentous 
single decision had already been made. As far as the Federal 
government was concerned, it was to be a war to the finish. 
The Lincoln administration made this decision. Interestingly 
enough the <:'-:Jl1!'t.rv at large accepted it, instinctively and 
without stoooing to reason about it. Of all the misunder-
standings that ~roduced the war, no single one had more tragic 
consequences than the fact that th?~~~ of the South had com-
pletely failed to realize how deAnly the concept of nationality 
had ta.ken root in the North.11 
General Irvin McDowell was appointed as field commander 
under General Scott. Although powerful political figures had 
suggested McDowell as commander, the reasons for his appoint~ 
ment were military. However, the new general was to enter a 
career which ended in tragedy. 
Around Washington the· government was assembling an army 
made up mostly of volunteers that numbered slightly over 
30,000 by early summer. Neither General Scott nor General 
McDowell had any idea of sending this green army into battle 
during the summer and fall of 1861. McDowell was oppressed 
with dif'ficulties which were real. His command of' an army over 
30,000 gave him the distinction of being the first general in 
our country's history to hold such a position.12 
10 Dictionary of' American Biography. 1932. v-8. pp. 151-152. 
Charleo Scribner's Sons. New York. 
11catton, ~ Hallowed Ground. pp. J5-J6. 
12Williams, p. 18. 
5 
Yet McDowell had no choice but to fight. Lincoln and his 
cabinet, as political authorities yielding to the country's 
demands and considering that the time of the three-month troops 
was about to expire, overruled Scott and McDoweli. 13 Late in 
June, Scott, at the insistence of the President, gave McDowell 
verbal instructions to prepare a plan of action against the 
Confederate army at Manassas. 
McDowell brought a plan to General Scott, and the two 
worked it over carefully. Scott approved the plan and on June 
29th presented it to Lincoln. Lincoln directed McDowell to 
·put his plan into execution. General Scott, however, was in 
favor of waiting until a larger and better trained and prepared 
army could win victories that would be decisive .J4 He knew that 
General Beauregard had 21,000 Confederate soldiers at Manassas 
Junction. Also another Confederate army was training under 
Joseph E. Johnston in the Shenandoah Valley. Plans were for 
a Union army under Robert Patterson, also in the Valley, to 
prevent Johnston's troops from joining Beauregard.15 
On Jt:ly 16, 1861, McDowell started an advance of 27 miles 
to Manassas in response to the popular demand that the Federal 
Government force a battle in Virginia. General Beauregard fell 
12Williams, p. 18. 
13 · Carl Sandburg: Abraham Lincoln, The War Years. 4-v. 
1939. Charles Scribner's Sons. New York:-V-r:-pp. 35-36. Cited 
hereafter as Sandburg, The:!:!!£. Years. 
14w1111ams, 19 ~1 pp. -  • 
15sandburg, Th w y l ~ .:...!£_ ears. v-. p. 301. 
6 
back and prepared for battle along the rough and wooded banks 
of the Bull Run, a tributary of the Potomac.16 On July 21st 
McDowell's troops began the fi.rhr.:in.&1; by driving the Confederates 
from their position and then from one position to another; 
finally the Confederates formed a line that held, and with the 
aid of ,'.'<".i.nforcements which had arrived from the Valley they 
were able to counterattack. ThiB counterattack completely routed 
the Union forces and started a wave or panic that did not 
subside 1mti.l the men reached the fortifications surrounding 
Washington.17 Had it not been for the arrival or fresh troops 
• from the Shenandoah Valley and the exhaustion of the Union 
troops, McDowell could conceive.bly have won the battle. 
Actually about 18,000 men had been engaged on each side. The 
North had 460 killed and 1124 wounded while the South had 387 
killed and 1582 wounded.18 
As battles or the Civil War go:, Manassas Junction was a 
very small one. However, it did serve as a warning to the 
North that the war would not be easily won. It was now 
apparent that the South would not give up without a struggle 
to the last man, and that is almost what happenect.19 
The people who had been loudest in clamoring tor an 
16Benjamin P. Thomas: Abraham Lincoln. 1952. Alfred A. 
Knopf. New York. p. 271. Cited herearter as Thomas. 
17Tyler Dennett: Lincoln and the Civil War. In the Diaries 
and Letters of John Hay. Dodd,"rfEiad & Co. New°'Y'ork. Fn. p. 24 
18Ballard, pp. 51-53. 
19 My conjecture. 
7 
advance on Richmond now realized the importance of the warn-
ings of Generals Scott and McDowell: the Government had sent 
half-trained boys on an impossible task; the results were, 
of course, disaster, a bad case of political disregard of 
professional advice.20 
Old General Scott had a clear eye. Others could talk 
about the one swift blow that would end the rebellion, but 
he saw it differently. The Confederacy, he believed, would 
never be subdued piecemeal; it would have to be enveloped 
and throttled. 
"Let the navy (said Scott) blockade the southern coast. 
The army, then, must drive down the Mississippi, open the 
river all the way to the Gulf, split the western states from 
the Confederacy and hold the Valley in such strength that the 
blockade of the Southland would be complete. With rebellion 
isolated, it could then be crushed at leisure. 11 21 
Scott's proposal was discussed at the White House, and 
became known as the KAnaconda Plan". It attempted to point 
out what was necessary be.fore a really ef.fective war could 
be waged. Although scoffed at, Scott's plan took root in the 
mind of Abraham Lincoln. In the end, the Anaconda idea became 
the basis for the Federal war effort.22 
20Ballard, p. 54. 
2lcatton, This Hallowed Ground. p. 52. 
22catton, This Hallowed Ground. p. 52. 
8 
Before making new plans Lincoln had to find a fresh army. 
There was, however, little difficulty in this since recruits 
came in faster than they could be trained. The problem was 
one of organization. For this task Lincoln sought the help 
of one George B. McClellan, a rising young General from 
Ohio, who took command of the troops around Washington on 
July 27, 1861. By early fall 1861, there were some 170,000 
men in the Union army, all well-trained and equipped. The 
time had come to consider new plans. It was at this point 
that Lincoln crone to the full realization that McDowell's 
job was too large for him to handle. At the same time he 
was probably beginning to have some doubts about General 
Scott too.23 
Thus it became General McDowell's destiny to be the 
first of a long line of Generals to be entrusted with the 
reins of command and later be demoted or relieved of duties 
altogether. Lincoln's search for a general had now begun.24 
23Williams, p. 23. 
24My conjecture. 
CHAPTER TWO 
GENERAL GEORGE B. McCLELLAN 
McClellan is the most controversial military figure of 
the Civil War; after ninety-four years, the controversy still 
rages. Lee is quoted as having characterized McClellan as 
the ablest of his opponents.l That McClellan was an able 
organizer, a close student of war, and beloved by his troops, 
few will deny. On the other hand his timidity, vacillation, 
procrastination and sensitiveness, his persecution mania, his 
arrogance toward Lincoln, and his monumental egotism suggest 
a psychopathic personality.2 
"Little Mac", or the "Young Napoleon", as he was f'avorably 
called by his troops, was below medium height but muscularly 
compact, with red hair, red mustache, and an authoritative 
manner.3 McClellan was extremely careful of the welfare of 
his men, and his almost tender carefulness of their lives 
contrasted afterwards with what appeared the ruthless careless-
ness oi' Grant .4 
lDouglas Southall Freeman: R. E. Lee. 4v. Charles 
Scribner's Sons. New York. 1947. v. 4. p. 475. 
2Henry s. Commanger: ~ Blue and The Gray:. 2v. 1950. 
The Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc. New York. v. 1. p. 193. Cited 
hereafter as Commanger. 
3Thomas, p. 284. 
10 
He was thirty-five when the war started. A West Point 
graduate, he had done well in the Mexican War, and later he 
was sent to the Crimea by the War Department to watch the 
British and French fight the Russians. Then with the rank of 
captain, he had resigned from the army to go into business. 
A capable engineer, by the spring of 1861 he had become 
president of the Ohio and Mississippi Railroad at ten-thousand-
dollars-a-year, and was working and living in Cincinnati, Ohio. 
The War reached out for him without delay.5 
In mid-April 1861, McClellan, who was a Pennsylvanian by 
birth, had received a message from Governor Andrew G. Curtin of 
Pennsylvania, inviting him to come to Harrisburg at once and 
take charge of the Pennsylvania troops. On his way to Harrisburg 
he stopped off at Columbus to advise the Governor of Ohio. 
This stopover made all the difference. 
The Governor explained what he was up against. He had what 
looked like the impossible job of getting ten thousand men 
ready for the field, and there was no one around who knew the 
first thing about the military arts. Under these circumstances 
the Governor had no intentions of letting a good West Pointer 
slip through his fingers, and he then and there offered McClellan 
the command of the Ohio troops. McClellan accepted, moved into 
4Lord Charnwood: 
Publishing Co. Garden 
as Charnwood. 
Abraham Lincoln. 1917. Garden City 
City, New York. p. 285. Cited hereafter 
Scatton, Mr. Lincoln's Army. p. 56 
11 
an office in the state house, and got down to work, a major-
general of volunteers.6 
As soon as the Ohio regiments were mustered into the 
United States service, McClellan found himself holding one of 
the key jobs in the whole army. Ohio was on the frontier. The 
western part of Virginia was just across the river and the 
Confederates had sent troops deep into the mountains. It was 
correctly supposed in Washington that this part of Virginia 
was strongly Unionist and it seemed important to drive them out. 
By the end of May, McClellan found himself commanding a 
small force of sizteen regL~ents from Ohio, nine from Indiana, 
and two from Virginia. He moved up into the mountains, found 
two Confederate detachments drawn up in the passes, attacked 
one and caved it in, causing the other to retreat, and then 
moved on to the town of Beverly, taking prisoners and securing 
everything west of the Alleghenies for the Union, and making 
possible the eventual formation of the state of West Virginia.? 
It had been neatly done; it was the North's first feat of 
arms and the country rejoiced at the news. The "annihilation", 
as he termed his victory in his dispatches, consisted in the 
retreat of the opposing forces and the loss by it of about a 
thousand men. Just before the battle McClellan issued a very 
egotistic statement to his troops which reads: "Soldiers! I 
have heard that there was danger here. I have come to place 
6catton, ~. Lincoln's Army. 
7catton, 1'1t· Lincoln's Army. 
P• 57. 
p. 58. 
12 
myself at your head and share it with you. I fear now but one 
thing--tha t you will not find foemen worthy of your steel. I 
know that I can count on you. n8 
This sort of thing went over big with t:p.e country at large, 
and just then, before anybody had forgotten about it, the news 
came in about the humiliating disaster to McDowell at Bull Run. 
So it was, that with very little actual military achievement 
to his credit, McClellan was called to Washington on July 27, 
1861, to be given the command of the Army of the Potomac which 
was in the process of reorganization. 
"He found Washington overrun with men in unii'orm who 
drifted about the streets (and jammed the saloons) in aimless 
confusion. He detailed regular army soldiers to police the 
place, got the wanderers back into camp, saw that the camps 
were properly laid out, ironed out the kinks in the commissary 
system so that everyone got plenty to eat, and in short, 
restored order."9 
He was in the process of creating an army, and it had a 
name, a name that would cast long shadows and stir great 
memories before the end came--the Army of the Potomac. More 
often, though, the newspapers spoke of it simply as "McClellan I s 
Army", and that was the way the men themselves thought of it. 
They were McClellan's men, and in spirit most of them would 
continue to be that as long as they lived.10 
Scatton,!'.!!:.· Lincoln's Army. p. 59. 
9catton, This Hallowed Ground. p. 53. 
lOCatton, This Hallowed Ground. pp. 53-54. 
13 
In his campaign in western Virginia, McClellan revealed 
most of the military and personal characteristics he would 
later manifest in his operation with a larger command. His 
preparations for battle were confident and energetic, but as 
the time came for action he became slow and timid. 
During the sUlllil1er and early fall, McClellan forged from 
the multitudes of volunteers placed at his command the Army 
of the Potomac, one of the finest fighting armies in the 
history of war. Whatever else he failed to do in the war, he 
created that army, and gave it a belief in itself that nothing 
could destroy. For this job Lincoln could not have picked a 
better man to reorganize McDowell's defeated troops.11 
Upon arrival in Washington, McClellan soon came to the 
realization that old General Scott was more of a hindrance 
than a help. Undeniably Scott was an obstacle--a querulous 
fuss-budget--his greatness only a memory. The job could not 
be done unless a way could be found around the old gentleman. 
McClellan started to ignore and bypass the General-in-chief, 
communicating directly with Lincoln and the members of the 
cabinet.12 
General Scott, finally realizing that he was being pushed 
into the background by an "Ambitious Junior 11 , wrote a form.al 
application requesting that he be placed on the retired list. 
On November 1, 1861, Lincoln accepted Scott's request and 
11 Williams, p. 29. 
12Williams, p. 32. 
f 
placed McClellan in command of 11 the wbo le army 11 • 13 
From the battle of Bull Run on July 21, 1861, to March 5, 
1862, the Southern army, under Genera.l Joseph E. Johnston, lay 
quietly drilling at Manasses. 
On April 2, 1862, McClellan started the celebrated 
Peninsula campaign. The movement of 100,000 men by water 
demanded a large number of ships, and the business of collect-
ing them was begun in Februa.ry. The progress up the Peninsula 
was very slow, He had not informed himself correctly as to the 
geography and the number of troops opposing him in Johnston 1 s 
army. On May 31, nearly two months after arrival, Johnston 
attacked at a disadvantage and was defeated. A part of the 
army pursued the enemy to within four miles of Richmond, and 
had McClellan acted with energy he could have.taken the city. 
The delay gave the enemy time to strengthen themselves in men 
and fortifications. During this engagement General Johnston 
was wounded and replaced as commander by the inspired Lee.14 
By now other things were going wrong, most of them growing 
out of a bitter difference of opinion between General McClellan 
and the Lincoln administration, 
A disagreement between a General and the government could 
have odd potentialities this spring of 1862. McClellan embodied 
the Democratic position. Any military program he might adopt 
could be considered a Democratic program, and it was all tooeasy 
13w111iama, p, 43. 
14charnwood, pp. 294-297. 
15 
to consider a Democratic program as "rebellious" at this time. 
Basicly the difference of opinion reflected divergent 
ideas on the kind of war the country was fighting. The admin-
istration had accepted it from the first as a revolutionary 
struggle, calling for hard blows struck quickly; McClellan always 
saw it as a traditional war-between-gentlemen affair, the sort 
in which a professional soldier could play straight. The 
administration wanted relentless combat but lacked military 
knowledge; McClellan had military knowledge but could not 
see that fund8lllentally this was a political war. It was 
becoming very hard for McClellan and Lincoln to agree about 
anything whatsoever.15 
McClellan was slowly but surely inching his way toward 
Richmond during the month of June, 1862. From June 26 to July 2 
there took place a series of engagements known as the Seven 
Days' Battle, in which the Union army was forced to retreat to 
a place known as Harrison's Landing. From this position of 
security, the army was slowly withdrawn and added to the forces 
of General John Pope and the Army of Virginia.16 
Meanwhile, Lincoln had appointed General Henry Halleck 
commander of all armies, the vacancy being caused by the absence 
of McClellan when he went to the Peninsula. During the time 
of the Peninsula campaign there were several small forces 
of Union soldiers in and around Washington and the Shenandoah 
l5catton, This Hallowed Ground. pp. 132-133. 
16Charnwood, pp. 297-299. 
16 
Valley, one of these a force of some 35-40,000 men under 
General McDowell. While the main part of the army was on 
the Peninsula it became necessary to appoint an overall com-
mander of these forces. Upon the recommendation of General 
Halleck and in view of his success in the West, General 
John Pope was given the responsibility of organizing these 
scattered detachments into a fighting unit.17 
Major General John Pope was an odd figure. Postmaster 
General Montgomery Blair had once remarked venomously ~hat he 
was a cheat and a liar like all the rest of his tribe. While 
a disgruntled Blair was apt to be harsh in his judgment, Pope 
did have a pronounced ability to irritate people. 
The War Department brought Pope east in a well-meant 
effort to inject a little vigor into the Virginia campaign. 
Some 50,000 troops were turned over to him, including those 
of McDowell. He was told to weld them into an army and go 
down and fight General Lee and his Confederate army. 
Pope began moving down the line of the Orange and Alexandria 
Railroad, preparing to descend on Richmond from the northwest, 
while McClellan's presence on the James forced the city's defend-
ers to look toward the southeast. McClellan remained in his 
--
camp, making no offensive gestures, and Lee presently concluded 
that it would be safe to send Stonewall Jackson to look after 
Pope.18 
'-7Thomas, pp. 335-336. 
18catton, This Hallowed Ground. pp. 153-154.. 
17 
Lee divided his army, sent Jackson on a wide swing to 
sever the Union communications and capture the supply depot 
at Manassas. After wreaking havoc behind the Northern lines, 
Jackson retreated northwest, fighting off pursuers in order to 
give Lee time to join him, On August 29, Pope caught up with 
Jackson near the old battle field of Bull Run. Pope then launched 
a series of costly attacks against a railroad embankment shelter-
ing Jackson's troops. Instead of attacking, he should have been 
seeking a position for defense, for General Longstreet had 
circled west and was now massed on Pope's left flank. Pope 
simply could not believe that any of Lee's troops had had time 
to catch up with him and he ordered an all out attack, which 
was repulsed with heavy loss, 
After this heavy defeat at Second Bull Run, Pope surmised 
that his position was worse than it was. He gave up hope before 
he needed to and asked to be drawn into the defenses around 
Washington.19 
It was very clear that neither the army nor public opinion 
would tolerate Pope after the fiasco of Se~ond Bull Run in 
Which an army of 90,000 had been routed by 55,000 Confederates. 
On September 5, Lincoln relieved him of command, and over 
vigorous opposition from his Cabinet, reappointed McClellan to 
CO!llilland of the now reunited Army of the Potomac. Lincoln was, 
however, determined that McClellan's command should be temporary 
because he believed the General incapable of offensive warfare. 
19Thomas, p~. 336-338. 
18 
A victory was needed for more reasons than one. Overseas 
the British Government seemed to be on the verge of recognizing 
the Confederacy as an independent nation--an act that would 
almost certainly bring effects as far-reaching and decisive as 
the French recognition of the American colonies had brought in 
1778. The British Prime Minister and Cabinet seemed at last ready 
to take the step. They would wait, however, a little while 
longer to see whet came of Lee's invasion of the North. 20 
Washington was now too strongly held to be attacked, but 
T.ee determined to invade Maryland. At least this would keep 
Virginia safe d~ring harvest time; his footsore troops might 
find new shoes in small-town stores; and the coming of his 
army might win him many recruits in slaveholding Maryland. 
All of this occured just as Abraham Lincoln was preparing 
to issue a proclamation of emancipation for Negro slaves. He 
had made up his mind during the summer. The base of the war 
would have to be broadened and an immeasurable new force would 
have to be injected into it. It would become now a social 
revolution, and there was no way to foretell the final con-
sequences. At the very beginning Lincoln had accepted secession 
as a variety of revolution and had unhesitatingly used revolu-
tionary measures to meet it; however, he clung tenaciously to 
the idea that the one ruling war aim was to restore the Union. 
Re had steered carefully away from steps that would destroy the 
whole social fabric of the South. But it could not be done that 
20catton, This Hallowed Ground. p. 158. 
19 
way. Come what might, Lincoln would free the slaves, as far as 
the stroke of a pen on a sheet of paper could,21 
As Lee moved northward, the army of the Potomac hovered 
on his right flank, safeguarding Washington. On September 13, 
1862, Lee's entire plan of operation fell into McClellan's 
hands when an Indiana private found a copy of an order wrapped 
around three cigars. Lee was dividing his forces, sending 
Jackson to Harper's Ferry in order to protect his communications, 
while the remainder of his troops moved toward Hagerstown where 
he could threaten Harrisburg and other Pennsylvania towns. 
With Lee's army widely dispersed, here was a chance to destroy 
it in detail. McClellan moved with unaccustomed speed for 
him, but still with extreme caution. With some 100,000 troops 
at his disposal, he thought Lee, whose whole strength did 
not a.mount to 50,000, must surely outnumber him.22 
The Army of the Potomac caught up with Lee and Jackson 
near the town of Sharpsburg, Maryland, which lies close to a 
small stream called the Antietam. There on September 17 and 18, 
1862, McClellan ordered an attack, to which he did not attempt 
to give his personal direction. His corps commanders led 
assaults on Lee's position at different times and in so dis-
connected a manner that each was repulsed singly, The overall 
effect was demoralizing to the Southerners. Had McClellan 
ordered one more attack and sent in the units he was holding in 
2lcatton, This Hallowed Ground. pp. 157-158, 
22Thomas, pp. 339-340, 
20 
reserve in case they were needed for a possible rear guard 
action, he would have utterly swept Lee's army from the field.23 
McClellan was at the crisis of his career and he fumbled the 
moment completely. 
Lee's men had taken a dreadful pounding. They had suffered 
astounding losses (more than ten thousand men between dawn 
and dusk--a good fourth of all the men he had on the field) 
but they had not q'.1i te been driven from Sharpsburg and the 
high ground. By every dictate of military logic, Lee would 
have to cross the Potomac and get back to Virginia as soon as 
darkness came. But Lee did not retreat. With fewer than 
thirty thousand infantrymen in his command, he calmly waited 
all day September 18 for McClellan to renew the fighting. (Of 
all the daring gamblers who ever wore an American military 
uniform, Lee unquestionably was the coolest.) Ria bluff worked, 
for McClellan pondered and waited for reinforcements and 
tomorrow, which never came. Lee ordered a retreat that night. 
Even McClellan was likely to attack if he was given time enough.24 
Here was a victoryover Lee, indisputably, even if a nega-
tive one. He had invaded the North with high hopes; he had 
been compelled to fight along the Antietam, and after the fight 
he had had to march back into Virginia. At enormous cost the 
army of the Potomac had won a strategic victory. However quali-
fied this triumph might be, at least the invasion was over. 
There would be a new campaign now, and it would take place south 
23catton, Mr. Lincoln's Army. pp. 312-314. 
24catton, This Hallowed Ground. pp. 168-169. 
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of the Potomac. McClellan was looking ahead to it.25 
Lincoln had promised to decree emancipation by the first 
of the new year. On December 1, 1862, he sent a messa;e to 
congress suggesting the adoption of a constitutional amendment 
providing for gradual, fully-compensated emancipation all 
across the land, in loyal states and in rebellious states alike. 
"Geography, r, said Lincoln, "was controlling; there could 
not be two nations here; the land itself would compel a reunion 
even if the attempt at secession won. Without slavery, the 
effort to force a separation could not long continue. Why not 
meet the inevitable hal.fway? Compensated emancipation would 
not cost as much as the war itself' was costing; also it would 
kill no young men. To save their country, men must disenthrall 
themselves from the dogmas of the past. To ~ive freedom to 
the slave was to preserve it !'or all others."26 
With the Emancipation Proclamation Lincoln would change 
the war, for himself as well as for everyone else. The war 
would now be pushed past settlement; the unconditional sur-
render which the government would always insist on would become 
something that the Confederate leaders would not even consider. 
In order that Lincoln might sign the Proclamation twenty-five 
thousand Americans, North and South had been shot.27 
Lincoln watched McClellan eagerly, and came to the 
25ca tton, Mr. Lincoln's Army. PP• 326-327. 
26catton, ~ Hallowed Ground. p. 184. 
27catton, ~ Hallowed Ground. PP• 170-172. 
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Antietam to see things for himself. He went back to Washington 
in the full belief that McClellan would move at once. To be 
certain of this, Lincoln uttered a warning, and to avoid any 
misunderstanding, followed it with a definite order. This 
order was dated October 5, 1862. The one dismissing Mc·Clellan 
was dated November 5. It was very likely that Lincoln had fixed 
in his own mind a time limit of one month as a test; he had a 
habit of fixing beforehand the time for taking certain action. 
If in that month McClellan fought a battle or made a real 
attemp.t to force a battle on Lee, he would be retained in 
command; if it was to be a repetition of the Peninsula-prepar-
ation for tomorrow, absolute disregard for orders--then he 
must go .28 
In the last analysis most of McClellan's difficulties 
stemmed from his .failure to take Lincoln into his confidence, 
as Grant later did. Lincoln, a.fter much deliberation, arrived 
at the opinion that McClellan was not f'it for command of' an 
army intended f'or off'ensive operations. This was an all-
sufficient reason for dismissing him. 
On November 7, 1862, General Eurnside was called and 
very reluctantly assumed command of the AI"fJJ.y of' the Potomac. 
McClellan's career was finished. Never was he to receive 
another assignment.29 
28Ballard, p. 135. 
29williarns, p. 177. 
CHAPTER THREE 
LINCOLN LOOKS IN VAIN FOR SOMEONE TO WIN A VICTORY 
Lincoln, in his search for a general, wanted a man who 
would make no fatal blunder. He must also be a man of un-
daunted enterprise; while he did not wish to expose the North 
to disaster he did mean to conquer the South.l 
Events were to prove Lincoln's selection of General 
Burnside a poor one, but to the desperate President he seemed 
the best man available. A graduate of West Point, thirty eight 
years old, the new commander had a genial, pleasing manner and 
an imposing presence, enhanced by lush side whiskers. Having 
twice rejected an offer of the command of the Army of the Potomac, 
he assUI1J.ed it with great misgivings, as a duty. An honest 
conscientious soldier, mindful of his own limitations, he told 
brother officers that he was not up to his job. History bears 
out the accuracy of his sel.:yc{ppraisal.2 
The Army of the Potomac was at Warrenton, Virginia, just 
south of Manassas Junction, when Burnside assumed command. He 
then proposed to strike straight south through Fredericksburg 
for Richmond. This plan would have succeeded ii' Burnside had 
lCharnwood, p. 287. 
2 Thomas, p. 348. 
had the full co-operation of General Halleck, as the Confederates 
under Longstreet were near Culpepper some thirty miles away 
~d Jackson was in the Shenandoah Valley. 
Burnside's whole plan hinged on the arrival of enough 
pontoons to construct three bridges across the Rappahannock 
River at Fredericksburg. While Burnside waited impatiently, 
Lee collected his forces on the heights beyond the town. 
Fredericksburg was deceptive. The Rappahannock which 
runs on an easterly course, turns south just above the town, 
and for a distance flows very nearly on a north-south line, 
with Fredericksburg lying on the west bank. To the west of 
the town there is a shallow open plain extending several miles 
downstream. Just beyond the plain lies a long chain of 
wooded hills which approximately parallels the river. This 
looks innocent enough since the hills are not high. To the 
south they trail off into gentle rolling country. But the 
hills are just high enough to make an ideal defensive position. 
Here on the crest Lee's army was securely posted.3 
By the time the pontoon bridges were completed, Lee's 
position was almost impregnable against a frontal attack. It 
was here that Burnside made his fatal mistake. He failed to 
make new plans after the original situation changed. Even as 
late as the day before the battle, Lee was still unable to 
believe that the main assault was to be made here, and to the 
3
~atton, This Hallowed Ground. p. 188. 
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1ast moment the Confederates thought that the crossing at 
Fredericksburg must be a ponderous feint.4 
Having committed himself to an advance here, Burnside 
felt there was nothing left but to try the impossible, and 
this he ordered the army to do, for there was a great stub-
bornness in him--a great stubbornness and nothing more. He 
had said he would cross at Frederi8ksburg, and at Fredericks-
burg he would cross, even if destruction awaited him, as it 
most assuredly did. 
11 In all the war no army moved up against a tougher 
position than Burnside's army encountered here at Fredericks-
burg. Without a miracle, the Confederate position here could 
not be taken by storm. 11 5 
The battle of Fredericksburg on December 13, 1862, can 
be summed up with few words: a frontal attack against a well-
prepared position. Rarely has less maneuver or finesse been 
seen in a general engagement. 
The verdict of the battle was quite definite enough to 
make another change in command necessary, and this was openly 
voiced in the army itself.6 On January 24, 1863, Burnside, 
feeling the growing resentment of his fellow officers, issued 
an ultimatum to President Lincoln that General Hooker and 
4Bruce Catton: Glory Road, 1952. Doubleday and Co., Inc. 
Garden City, New York. p. ~ Cited hereafter as Catton, 
Glory Road, 
5catton, This Hallowed Ground. pp. 187-188. 
6 Ballard, p. 152. 
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several other staff officers be relieved from their duties. 
This ultimatum was accompanied by Burnside's resignation and 
stated in part that the President could accept the one that 
was best for the army and the country.? 
Lincoln dismissed Burnside, and--somewhat reluctantly, 
as his letters reveal--appointed in his place "Fighting Joe" 
Hooker, whom Burnside declared to be "unfit to hold an import-
ant commission during a crisis like the present." It was per-
haps the one time when Burnside I s judgment proved sound. 
Joseph Hooker was a slim and handsome man, with rosy 
cheeks and cold eyes, a hard-drinking, hard-living general 
with some coarseness of fiber. At his headquarters there 
was a glitter of arrogance, and in his speech in the spring 
of 1863 there was a contemptuous confidence in victory, a 
glib preacceptance of triumph that might just possibly hide 
a deep inner uncertainty.8 
By the end of April 1863, Hooker had what he called "the 
finest army on the planet." Certainly it was the largest and 
best equipped that had ever been seen in America. Against 
Hooker's force of some 130,000 men Lee could muster less than 
60,.000, (for Longstreet's corps was miles away, south of the 
James River). 
Hooker, like Burnside, was another man who had a river to 
cross--the Rappahannock. He knew he could count on the troops, 
for the Army of the Potomac had been tried and proven many 
?Williams, pp. 205-206. 
Scatton, This Hallowed Ground. p. 238. 
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times. They could do just about anything their commander want-
ed them to do if he could use them to their full potential. 
The question mark was Joe Hooker.9 
Hooker's strategy was admirable. Leaving Sedgwick with 
40,000 men at Fredericksburg, he planned to move up the Rappa-
hannock, cross over through the wilderness, catch Lee in a 
giant pincers movement, and overwhelm him. By the end of April 
Hooker had completed the reorganization of the army and except 
for a reserve corps was across the Rappahannock and prepared 
to move on Lee. 
First Hooker sent General Stoneman off on a cavalry raid 
designed to disorganize Lee's communications and threaten 
Richmond. When he moved up the river to Chancellorsville he 
failed to catch Lee by surprise; when Slocum's corps moved 
down the plank road toward Fredericksburg it ran into well-
entrenched Confederate opposition. Instead of giving battle, 
Hooker mysteriously withdrew to Chancellorsville, thus giving 
the initiative to Lee, who promptly seized and exploited it. 
Once again Lee out-generaled his adversary, using Hooker's 
own strategy. Instead of being caught in a pincer, he caught 
Hooker in a like maneuver, rolled him up on both flanks and 
pushed him back to the edge of the river; then he turned on 
the hapless Sedgwick and sent him hurtling back across the 
river.lo 
9catton, This Hallowed Ground. p. 239. 
10commager, pp. 228-229. 
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Hooker's sudden withdrawl can be partially explained. 
Early in the battle he was wounded from the explosion of an 
artillery shell and was in shock. As a result he lost self-
control and presence of mind and took his losses to be greater 
than they were, and drew his army back across the Rappahannock 
to Chancellorsville.11 
Chancellorsville was a dearly bought .victory. Confeder-
ate casu,alt:i.es were 18,156, of which almost eleven thousand 
were killed or wounded. In some ways it was the most spectacular 
victory of Lee's career, and yet this victory was sterile. Not 
only had it cost the Coni'ederacy more than it could afford to 
pay in men and materials, but it had been the final engage-
ment for Stonewall Jackson, who was literally irreplaceable.12 
The rest of the spring the two armies faced each other 
across the Rappahannock. Then on June 5, 1863, Lee unexpectedly 
broke camp and headed north. Lincoln advised Hooker to follow 
the Confederates on the inside of the curve, thus protecting 
Washington and their lines of communication at all times. 
By now the War Department's distrust of Hooker was solid. 
Re was crippled by his failure at Chancellorsville and could 
not take the initiative. He, nor anyone else, could prevent 
What was coming,13 
As the Army of the Potomac moved northward, a long and 
11Charnwood, p. 311. 
12
catton, .1'.hi! Hallowed Ground. p. 244, 
13catton, This Hallowed Ground. p. 247. 
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low burning animosity between Hooker and Halleck flared. The 
i Was a garrison of· 10,000 men at Harper's immediate s sue 
Ferry. 
Hooker wanted this force to join his main body. On June 
apparently lost his temper and demanded that the 27, Hooker 
dispute be referred to the President, and without waiting for 
a reply, followed his first tele~rP~ with another, offering 
his resignation.14 
Lincoln, whose own calm was unruffled even in his most 
de.spondent moments, had been watching the symptoms, and when 
the outbreak confirmed his suspicions, there was not the slight-
est hesitation in making up his mind. That same night Meade 
received orders to take up the connna.nd of the Army of the Potomac.15 
Meade replaced Hooker on Jn-r:,:; 27, 1863, just three days 
oei'ore the opening of the battle of Gettysburg. This was un-
welcome ne.ws, fo.r the enlisted men still liked Hooker. But if 
mo,s,t of the_ soldiers felt that the government had made a mistake 
in this change of commanders they kicked up no fuss over it. 
The ard·ent hero worship of the old volunteer days was· gone now. 
The heroes• had'. departed and the men themselves had lost their 
o.ld need to make and worship heroes. The man at the top might 
be anybody; it no longer seemed to matter much.16 
G.eneral. Meade was a Pennsylvanian forty-seven years old, 
~omas, pp. 381-383. 
l.5B'allard, p. 152. 
I6c atton, Glory~. p. 282 • 
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of good family, and very highly educated. He had commanded a 
division at Fredericksburg, where he was one of the few generals 
who earned renown. Tall and straight, he had an expression that 
has been described as somewhat reserved but somewhat irritable. 
He had none of the personality characteristics which had en-
deared McClellan to his men. However, Meade was a thorough and 
reliable soldier. The victory at Gettysburg which followed six 
days after his appointment, silenced any possible criticism 
which might have been made about his selection, and consoli-
. dated his position. He was to continue in command of the Army 
of the Potomac till the end of the war.17 
It was a critical situation which General Meade was called 
upon to face when he took command at the end of June 1863. A 
Confederate army was on Northern soil, and the people of the 
North were panic-stricken. So intense was the criticism directed 
against all officers of the Army of the Potomac, that when 
handed his appointment as commander of that army General Meade 
at first mistook it for an order for his arrest.18 
In June 1863, General Lee had decided to carry the war 
into the North by an invasion of Maryland end-Pennsylvania. 
This, he thought, would strengthen the peace party of the North, 
which was loudly demanding peace at any price. It would also 
give Virginia a chance to rest from the ravages of war, and if 
successful it might win some of the European nations to rec-
17Ballard, pp. 164-165. 
18williams, p. 260. 
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0gnize the Confederacy as an independent nation. The time 
seemed ripe for the undertaking. The armies of the North were 
not in good condition. The terms of the men had expired, and 
Hooker was rendered ineffective by his defeat at Chancellors-
ville and General Meade was but newly appointed to fill the 
vacancy• 
For two weeks General Lee had carried all before him. 
His troops had begun to cross the Potomac on June 15; they had 
marched through Maryland, entered Pennsylvania, and were ad-
vancing upon Harrisburg, the capital of the Keystone State. 
For a time the Northern leaders feared an attack on Washington, 
but when it became evident that invasion of Pennsylvania was 
Lee's object, Meade followed in hot pursuit. 
nThe battle of' Gettysburg was more or less an act of' f'ate; 
a: three-day storm of terror, unplanned and uncontrollable, 
coming inevitably out of' the things hard-pressed men had done 
in. light o.f imperfect knowledge, the end result o.f actions that 
moved toward a fundamental goal •••• It was enormously destructive, 
its significance was not seen until long a.fter it had ended, 
and it opened and closed with moments of' heartbreaking drama. 11 19 
Gettysburg was a dot on the map marking a place where all 
the roads crossed; a pleasant little town lying a.mid rolling 
hills and broad shallow valleys, a blue mountain wall rising 
a score or more miles to the west. 
nit had not been intended to deliver a general battle so 
19 
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far from the base unless attacked," wrot.e General Lee. "But 
coming unexpectedly upon the whole Federal army, to withdraw 
through the mountains with our extensive trains would have 
been difficult and dangerous. rr20 In a sense, the battle at 
Gettysburg was an accident; neither Lee nor Meade wanted a 
fight there, though once the fighting had begun Meade saw 
the advantages of the terrain south of the town for defensive 
fighting. 
Advance parties of the Confederate and Union forces met 
in conflict on July 1st. Some of the Confederate cavalry were 
on.their way to the village of Gettysburg to obtain shoes, as 
there was a serious shortage among the rank and file and 
numerous troops were barefooted. There they met an advance 
guard of Union cavalry and the battle was on. On this first 
day Lee did achieve some success and drove the northern troops 
from the steep heights that form Seminary Ridge. As all of this 
was taking plac~ several urgent messages were sent and Federal 
infantry began to arrive and give support to the action. The 
Southern forces were of sufficient number however, and continued 
to press home their advantage and succeeded in driving their 
adversaries out of the town and to the high ground just to the 
south. Here on Cemetery Ridge Meade made his stand. 
By the evening of the first day the Federal troops who 
were left were beginning to reassemble on this high ground, 
grimly determined to hold on until the rest of the army came 
20w· 11· J. J. a.ms , p. 264. 
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up, but not at all sure they could do it. 
It was possible that Lee could have gained a foothold 
on Cemetery Ridge that evening, since most of his scattered 
army was now on the scene. The Union forces were badly 
outnumbered. One final assault in the old Stonewall Jackson 
manner could conceivably have done it. However, he was 
fighting in the dark with most of his cavalry that might 
have told him where all of Meade's men were, still absent. 
And Jackson was in his grave. By the time the Southern 
generals had conferred, considered and weighed the risks, 
it was too late. The battle would have to be resumed the 
next day.21 
July second found most of both armies at the scene. 
The day was made up of numerous separate attacks against 
the Federal positions on either end of Cemetery Ridge. 
Southern forces under General Richard Ewell tried to take 
Culp's Hill on the northern end of the Union line. They found 
the federals posted in solid breastworks of earth and felled 
trees. They struggled up the hillside, stumbled back down and 
tried again, won a foothold that threatened the Union army 
with disaster--and could not quite make it, as the chain light-
ning of the flashing guns laced the Southern line relentlessly,22 
At the southern end of the Union line, around the Peach 
Orchard, the Confederate cause was a little more successful. 
2lcatton, This Hallowed Ground. p. 251. 
22catton, This Hallowed Ground. pp. 252-253, 
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Union General Dan Sickles posted his men on the Emmitsburg 
road against orders. Longstreet attacked Sickles at the 
Peach Orchard amid an intense artillery bombardment. There 
was hand to hand fighting with bayonets and musket butts. 
Sickles' corps was forced to give ground back to a high place 
known as Little Round Top and Big Round Top, the southern 
anchor of the Union line. 23 
On July third Lee renewed his attack. After a lull in the 
fighting in the late morning a terrific cannonade began at 
approximately 1:00 P.M. This was supposed to soften the 
Union lines for one final assault. Meade surmised correctly 
that the next big attack would be launched against the center 
of his line since Lee had tried both ends of the Union position 
without gaining any decisive advantage. 
It is somewhat difficult to determine the exact time that 
lapsed before the infantry lines of General Pickett were put 
in motion after the artillery firing along Seminary Ridge 
had ended. The most conservative estimate is about one hour. 
This time lapse gave the Union lines enough time to bring 
up fresh guns from the artillery reserve and to mass fresh 
divisions of infantry in rear of the front lines. All this 
being true, is there any doubt as to the cause for the 
failure of General Lee's expectations?24 
23catton, This Hallowed Ground. p. 25J. 
24Robert M. Stribling: Gettysburg Campaign~ Camnaigns 
.£! 186~ and 1865 in Vir~inia. 1905. The Franklin Press Co. 
Petersburg, Va. p. 60-ol. Cited hereafter as Stribling. 
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The Union soldiers atop Cemetery Ridge saw an army 
moving out from the woods into the open field by ranks. Rank 
upon endless rank were drawn up with parade-ground precision, 
battle flags and all. General George Pickett's Virginians and 
ten thousand men from other commands were to begin his famous 
charge. 25 
Pickett's men were mowed down like grain. Great gaps 
appeared in their lines, but these were closed immediately. Their 
thinning ranks swept on until a small remnant, led by the gal-
.lant Armistead, crossed the Federal lines on the crest of 
Cemetery Ridge, The Stars and Bars waved over the Union defenses 
briefly. But the price had been great; the few who remained 
could not hold what they had won. Attacked on all sides, they 
threw down their arms and fled. Lee's great assault, one of 
the most desperate charges in all history, had failed.26 
Pickett's charge was the highwater mark of the Confeder-
acy, A total of 15,oaa Southern soldiers started across that 
open wheat field which was one mile wide. A little more than 
a thousand made it back to their own lines. This was the 
turning point of the war; never again would Lee have strength 
enough to invade northern soil.27 Union forces had suffered 
4,000 killed, 12,000 wounded, and 4,000 prisoners, about 
20,000 in all. The Rebels lost 5,500 killed, 21,000 wounded 
and about 9,000 prisoners, also 4,000 stragglers for a total 
25·catton, This Hallowed Ground, pp. 251-257. 
26compton's, v-6. pp. 105-106. 
27catton, Glory Road, pp. 337-334, 
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of about 40,000. The battle of Gettysburg resulted in checking 
the progress and then in destroying the power of a well-dis-
ciplined and defiant Southern army.28 
General Meade had fought with great tactical skill. He 
placed his men well, and used his reserves ~roperly to bolster 
threatened places in his lines. However, he showed no aggress-
ive spirit, and was content to fight a completely defensive 
battle. 29 
At Gettysburg, as at Antietam, Lee was u.~willing to admit 
defeat, but stood his ground defiantly the next day, awaiting 
a Union attack. Perhaps Meade should have attacked, but he had 
suffered over 20,000 casualties and 15,000 desertions, and an 
attack might have led to a bloody repulse. On the afternoon of 
the fourth, Lee started his long retreat to Virginia. A heavy 
rain set in swelling the Potomac; not until the night of the 
thirteenth did Lee have his army on Confederate soil.30 
Meade and the Federal army followed Lee with extreme 
caution very much aware that the Confederate army was still as 
dangerous as a wounded tiger. In the end both armies returned 
to Virginia. Another Confederate invasion had been repulsed.31 
It would be too much to say that certain victory was with-
in Meade's reach after Gettysburg, for there is no such thing 
28M. Jacobs: The Rebel Invasion of Maryland & Pennsylvania. 
1864. J.B. Lippincott & Co. PP• 46-4"7':" 
29Williams, p. 264. 
30commager, p. 63R. 
31catton, This Hallowed Ground. p. 257. 
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as a certainty in war--but it is a fact that he had a better 
chance then than ever presented itself to a Union commander 
either before or afterward, Lincoln, the amateur strategist, 
grasped it at the time, while his professional soldiers were 
congratulating themselves on "driving the invader from our 
~oil, 11 32 
With high water at his back to prevent Lee from crossing, 
Meade was still unable to comprehend that the Confederates had 
been badly beaten and were in no shape to resume the offensive. 
Lincoln, on learning of Lee's escape to the south bank of the 
Potomac, said "We had them within our grasp. We had only to 
stretch forth our hand and they were ours. 11 33 
On the day after Gettysburg the southern fortress of 
Vicksburg surrendered to General Grant. The North received the 
news with deep but sober joy. It was then realized that these 
two great events marked the turning point. The South would 
not be able to win the war by the use of military force. 
Meade saw the President on October 23,1863, They agreed 
that active operations for the year might as well be ended. 
It was undoubtedly on this occasion that Lincoln told Meade 
that after Gettysburg the General had reminded him of an old 
woman shooing geese across a creek,34 
When the Army of the Potomac took up the offensive 
again the next spring it would have a new General-in-Chief' 
32sallard, p. 171, 
331iilliams, p. 268. 
34williams, pp. 288-289. 
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and at last be on the road to victory.35 
35My conjecture. 
CRAFTER FOUR 
ULYSSES S. GRANT 
At the outbreak of the war Ulysses S. Grant was working 
as a clerk in a leather store in the mining-boom town of Galena, 
Illinois. Whatever the bleak years that preceded his going to 
. work for his father in 1860 had really meant to him, they had 
somehow· seasoned him for the job ahead, 
In May 1861, Grant was appointed colonel of the 21st. 
Illinois infantry. In August he was made a brigadier general 
of volunteers and given command of southeastern Missouri with 
headquarters at Cairo. From the start Grant's policy showed the 
agressiveness which marked his whole career. He at once took 
possession of Paducah, Kentucky. On November 1st he routed 
the Confederate garrison at Belmont, Missouri, thus securing 
that state for the Union cause. 
By the first of February 1862, Grant had conceived the 
importance of Forts Henry and Donelson in western Tennessee 
and submitted a plan to move upon them. The plan was finally 
approved by General Halleck and on February 6, after a very 
minor skirmish, the Confederates abandoned Ft. Henry and marched 
the twleve miles overland to Ft. Donelson. Ten days later, on 
February 17, Grant telegraphed General Halleck that Ft. Vonelson 
had surrendered with about 14,000 prisoners. 'I'he defenders had 
asked for terms, a.nd Grant, with determination that seemed so 
41 
singularly lacking in other Northern Generals, had replied, ''No 
terms except an unconditional and immediate surrender can be 
accepted. I propose to move L11Inediately upon your works. n The 
North had a new hero in 11 Unconditional Surrender" Grant, and 
Lincoln looked into the record of this thirty-nine years old 
short, stubby, whiskered, unmilitary looking man.l This double 
victory cracked the center of the Confederate line in Kentucky. 
(,vith their flanks endangered, the Southern forces had to pull 
completely out of Kentucky and part of Tennessee. 
Halleck was jubilant, for Grant was under his command 
and so Grant's triumph was his triumph. In relaying the news 
to Washington Halleck sue;gested that Grant, as well as Buell 
and Pope, be promoted to major general. 
In Washington, Lincoln had been looking on with a canny 
scrutiny that missed very little; he had his own ideas as to 
who should be promoted. To the Senate Lincoln sent but one 
name, that of Ulysses S. Grant to be major general of volunteers. 
For after all, Grant, the dull plodder, had been the actual author 
of victory at Forts Henry and Donelson.2 
After his victories along the Tennessee and Cumberland, 
Grant had moved his army up the Tennessee River and encamped 
at a place near Shiloh church called Pittsburg Landing, which 
was very close to the Mississippi state line. While awaiting 
further orders, his troops were vi3orously attacked by Rebel 
lThomas, pp. 306-307. 
2Bruce Catton: U.S. Grant and The American Military 
Tradition. Little, Brown and Co., Boston. pp. 77-78, Cited 
hereafter as Catton, U.~. Grant. 
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eral Albert Johnston. Grant and Halleck, in making plans Gen 
for a move on Corinth, Mississippi, made but one small error. 
They very no_ri_chalantly assumed that Johnston and Beauregard 
would sit still and wait to be attacked. 
The Confederates at Corinth knew if they waited where 
they were they would be severely defeated. Their one hope 
was to smite the Yankees before their separate forces were 
consolidated into one large fighting unit for a final push into 
Mississippi.3 
The first day's battle at Shiloh was a serious disaster 
to the Union army. Their position seemed to have been selected 
without any special reference to resisting an attack from the 
enemy, and they were all but driven from the field. Although 
the army fought most gallantly in various separate encounters, 
the day closed with Union forces at the river's edge. Fortunate-
ly, the advance of Euell's army formed a junction with Grant 
late in the afternoon, and that night all of Euell's army 
arrived. During the night the two Generals laid their plans 
for an offensive movement early the next morning. After another 
heavy battle the lost field was regained and the Confederates 
were broken up and compelled to retreat. The first reports 
from the Shiloh battle field created profound alarm throughout 
,the entire country. It was freely charged that Grant had neg-
lected his command by not digging entrenchments and that the 
3catton, u. s. Grant. p. 83. 
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only reason he was not totally defeated was the timely arrival 
of Buell. Lincoln took official notice of these accusations 
and instructed Stanton to ask Halleck whether misconduct on 
the part of Grant or any other officer had contributed to the 
nurnber of casualties at the battle of Shiloh. Numerous people 
of position requested Lincoln to remove Grant after this near 
disaster. Lincoln quietly replied with the timely comment, "I 
can't spare this man; he fights. 114 
On July 17, 1862, General Halleck left for Washington to 
fill the vacancy created when McClellan departed for the Pen-
insula and gave up the General-in-Chief duties. 
In some ways General Halleck was very well suited to be 
General-in-Chief in the Civil War. He was a born gossip and a 
politician, and for this, if for no other reason, he readily 
understood that the administration's main problems were political 
rather than military. If a Buell had to be sacked and a Ben 
Butler had to be retained because of political pressure, Halleck 
could understand it and adjust to it, and he would soothe other 
generals with chatty, half-indiscreet letters of explanation.5 
There was no replacement named for Halleck and the armies 
Which he had scattered over all of Tennessee and Kentucky were 
no longer under a central command. The largest force was under 
Grant at Corinth, Mississippi. Thus it was that this moderate 
force could do little but sit tight and watch the foe until it 
i 4Paul M. Angle: The Lincoln Reader. 1947. Rutgers Univer-
s ty Press. New Brunswick. pp. 400-402. 
5catton, ~ Hallowed Ground. p. 270, 
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either received more men or new orders. 
Near the end of October Grant sent a suggestion to Halleck. 
He requested certain small reinforcements and the authority to 
abandon some of the small scattered posts that he was then 
holding, This done, he believed that he could move down the 
Mississippi Central Railroad--which ran from Tennessee down 
to Jackson, Mississippi, due east of Vicksburg--and force the 
Rebels to evacuate Vicksburg. Halleck wired his approval, and 
said that be wanted to see an active campaign on the Mississippi 
that fall.6 
Grant's operations on Vicksburg began in November 1862. 
Advancing directly along the Mississippi Central Railroad 
toward Vicksburg, he detached Sherman with part of the force 
to proceed down the river to give a flanking movement on 
the town. In the meantime Southern cavalry cut Grant's 
communications and caused him to retreat to Corinth. Sher-
man, obeying orders, attacked the Fort and suffered a defeat. 
This was the first of a long series of failures at Vicksburg 
for Grant; however, he finally decided upon a brave and 
rather bold plan of action. He took his entire army to the 
west bank of the River and marched south of the town and 
then recrossed to the east bank and marched north to cut off 
Vicksburg from supplies and reinforcements. This done, all that 
· remained to do was to sit and wait them out, for after several 
attacks upon the fortifications Grant soon realized that the 
6 Catton, U. s. Grant. pp. 92-95, 
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only way they would be beaten was by siegecraft. The seige 
lasted from March until July 4, 1863. The capture of Vicksburg 
and the victory at Gettysburg marked the beginning of the end 
for the Rebels. 7 
Thirty thousand Southern soldiers surrendered at Vicksburg 
and marched off as paroled prisoners of war. From the President, 
Grant received a very warm and personal letter in which was 
stated in part that he had been promoted to a major general in 
the regular army. 
After the fall of Vicksburg, Port Hudson to the south 
surrendered, lock stock,. and barrel, on July 9, 1863. There 
were no longer any Confederate troops or fortifications any-
where along the Mississippi River. 
The pattern of the conflict was developing just about 
as Winfield Scott had thought it might in the dim days before 
Bull Run. What hR.d been accomplished needed no elaboration. 
It was the logical conclusion of all that had been done in the 
West since the war began. The Confederacy had been cracked 
now and other cracks would follow. Mr. Lincoln would use super-
lative words to describe Gettysburg, but Vicksburg could be 
summed up in one sentence: "The father of waters rolls 
unvexed to the sea. rr8 
By the final week in September the picture in the West 
had almost completely changed. The victory of the Southerners 
7charnwood, pp. 350-356. 
8catton, This Hallowed Ground. pp. 264-265. 
46 
at Chickamauga threatened to cancel the gains made at Vicks-
burg. It was at this time that the Secretary of War, Edwin 
Stanton, went to Indianapolis to confer with Grant and appoint 
him to command all armies in the West. 
Grant went immediately to Chattanooga and replaced Rose-
crans with Thomas. By late November he was ready to move upon 
the Rebels. The battle of Lookout Mountain lasted three days, 
and ended in an overwheLuing victory, although it did not go at 
all as Grant had planned. Eastern Tennessee was now in Union 
possession. The second of Lincoln's great strategic objectives 
had been achieved, and like the first--the opening of the 
Mississippi--achieved by Grant. 
Late in February, Congress passed a bill reviving the 
rank of lieutenant general and empowered the President to 
appoint one officer from the present group of major generals. 
Of course everyone knew that it would be Grant, and on March 
9, 1864, he was officially commissioned lieutenant general and 
given supreme command of the country's armies.9 
General Grant was a man of slim figure, only five feet 
eight inches in height and slightly stooped. He weighed a 
slight hundred and thirty-five pounds. He had a certain modesty 
and gentleness of manner which seemed to be more befitting the 
courtroom than the army camp. Like nearly all men who spoke 
little, he was a good listener. When not pressed by any matter 
of importance he was often slow in his movements, but when 
9williarns, pp. 290, 297, 299. 
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roused to activity he was q'1ick in every motion, and worked 
with marvelous rapidity. 
He was civil to all who came in contact with him, and 
never attempted to snub anyone, or treat anybody with less 
consideration because he held a lesser rank. He never crit-
icized an officer harshly in the presence of others. If 
criticism was necessary it was never made an occasion to wound 
his feelings or humiliate him. 
Grant was one of the few soldiers holding high rank who 
did not waste his time giving personal attention to petty 
,,details. In the performance of these duties he held his sub-
ordinates to a strict accountability, and kept his time free 
for thought. It was Grant's quiet and intense thinking that 
led to the prompt and vigorous actions which were constantly 
witnessed during the entire last year of the war.10 
Now Grant was the top northern general. Broadly speaking 
he could make his headquarters where he chose and do as he 
pleased with the armies of the country, as the War Department 
and the White House were pledged to give him their full support.11 
'..Jhen he became General-in-Chief, Grant was about as 
perfectly trained and formed for the post as any general could 
be, He had under his command no less than seventeen different 
commanders and some 533,000 men--no small task for the little 
store clerk from Galena.12 
10 cornmager, po. 973-976, 
11catton, This Hallowed Ground. pp. 313-314, 
121
,,!illiarns, pp. 303, 312. 
I' 
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"A physician on his staff once asked him about the art 
of war, expecting a dissertation on Jomini or some other world 
authority. Grant replied that the art of war was really sim-i:ile 
enough; at the bottom, it meant to 'find out where your enemy is, 
get at him as soon as you can and strike him as hard as you 
can, and keep on moving.' This uncomplicated creed he had 
followed ever since Belmont and Fort Henry, and it precisely 
expressed the q1 . 1ali ty that Abraham Lincoln had been looking 
for in his generals for so long a tLne. nlJ 
There were no sweeping changes in organization or appoint-
ments after Grant's commission. Halleck was allowed to remain 
in Washington in a military capacity which would correspond to 
that of the "chief of staff" today. Meade remained officially 
at the head of the Army of the Potomac, issuing orders in accord-
ance with the plans of Grant. Grant had asked Meade to stay 
on, having decided that it might lower morale to have a western 
general lead an eastern army. 
At first Grant decided to make his headquarters in the 
West; at this point Lincoln interfered in military affairs and 
requested Grant to stay in the East, pointing out that it was 
here that the largest and most powerful Confederate army was 
operating under the superb leadership of one General R. E. Lee. 
President Lincoln had at long last found his general and 
he trusted him almost completely because he believed the Gen-
eral to be a great soldier. Lincoln approved of Grant's strategy 
13catton, This Hallowed Ground. p. 314. 
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and let the general execute it as he saw fit because Grant 1 s 
plans were f~ndamentally the sane as those of Lincoln,14 
The Army of the Potomac, under General Grant, 122,000 
strong on April 30, 1864, was enca...~ped north of the Rapidan 
River. The Rebel army under Lee, numbering 62,000, lay south 
of the stream. The strategy of Grant 1 s campaign against Lee 
is simple enough. His objective was not so much Richmond as 
Lee's army; his policy was to ha.mrner away at it until it was 
decimated. Lee's task was to inflict such losses upon him that 
he would abandon the oi'.:'ensive or that the North would despair 
of victory and turn Lincoln out at the fall elections. With 
almost anyone else Lee's strategy might have worked, but in 
Grant he had an opoonent who never knew when he was licked.15 
The Army of the Potomac moved down into the tangled 
wilderness region below the Rapidan on ~ay h, 1864, trying 
to slip past Lee's right flank and force him to fight in the 
open country. Lee sent his troops in and a fantastic battle 
boiled for two days. After a loss of 17,000 men, Grant then 
marched south, as if the battle had been won and not lost. 
The soldiers were now on the road to the most sustained fight-
ing of the war.16 
The Second Battle of the Wilderness was not a defeat 
because Grant simply refused to a~~it that he had been beaten. 
14williams, pp. JOO, 303, 306, 332. 
15cornmager, p. 969, 
16 catton, Q, Grant. p. 122. 
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He kept on moving, and in a direction that would make c~nt-
inued fighting i:c.evitable. This was the one great poi.nt he 
had stated in his brief philosophy of the strategy of war.17 
Hanover Courthouse and Spotsylvania were long-drawn battles 
as deadly as anything in military history. Yet Lee always kept 
one step ahead, and the Federal soldiers were forever compell-
ed to attack. Still Lee could do no more than st2.ve off defeat. 
He was forced to fight the kind of war he could not win. Sooner 
or later he would be in a line around Richmond, forced to stand 
.seige, and a seige could end only one way. 
Cold Harbor was a mistake and showed a lack of finesse on 
the part of the commander. However, Grant had to try to overwhelm 
them here, for not to do so would have been an admission that 
Lee might possibly hold out long enough to force the North 
to come to terms. There was always the possibility that this 
might be the battle that would win the war. 
After tbe battle of Cold Harbor, to all appearance, it was 
a deadlock. The Army of the Potomac could no longer sidle to 
its left as its left touched the Chickahominy River. One 
more side-slip would put it up against the trenches of Richmond. 
However, there was one more move that Grant could make.18 
If he could possibly get the Army of the Potomac out of 
its trenches witho~t the Southerners being aware of the maneu-
ver they could leave the Cold Harbor sector and march southeast 
17catton, This Hallowed Ground. p. 326. 
l8catton, This Hallowed Ground. p. 330. 
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to the Je1nes River. Once across, the army could drive on to the 
sme.11 city of Petersburg which lay on the south bank of the 
Appomattox rtiver some ten miles due south of Richmond. However, 
all this would be possible only if the engineers could build 
a pontoon bridge over a deep stream nearly a half mile wide. 
Peters)urg was the place the Confederates had to hold if they 
planned to stay in nicbmond. All but one of the railroads 
coming from the South with supplies and ammunition passed through 
here. If Lee meant to stay in Richmond a.nd int he war he 
must retain possession of this city. A blow at Petersburg was 
a blow Lee must avoid no matter what it might cost,19 
On June 15, 1861.i., Petersburg came under attack and the 
seige was about to begin. It is here that we see the modernity 
of Grant 1 s mind. It is most apparent that his grasp of the 
war was becoming total and that the destruction of the enemy's 
economic resources was as ef:ective and legitimate a form 
of warfare as the destruction of his armies. By mid-November 
1864, General Sherman was ready to flame across Georgia. And 
in February of 1865 Sheridan had cleared the valley of ~ebels 
and everything else. To Lee this economic warfare was need-
less and cruel to civilians. Leewas the last of the great 
old-fashioned generals, Grant the first of the modern.20 
Meanwhile there was the situation at Petersburg itself. 
Grantts problem was far from si~ple. If he held Lee where he 
was, the North would finally win. But if there was any way 
19catton, This Hallowed Ground. p. 330. 
20williams, pp. 314, 340, 349. 
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to strike one hard blow that would end things quickly, that 
way had to be tried. Late in July 1864, it appeared that such 
a way might be at hand. 
It seems that the 48th regiment from Pennsylvania was 
made up largely of men from the coal mining section of that 
state. This regiment held a section of trench and fortifica-
tions opposite a Confederate strong point. 
Faced with idleness and boredom, this group presented their 
commander, General Burnside, with the idea of digging a mine 
tunnel under the trenches to the enemy's side. This was agreed 
upon. It was felt that the project would at least give them 
something to do and keep them busy for awhile, and there was a 
slight possibility that it might work. 
The mine tunnel was nearly five hundred feet long. It 
was completed by the end of July and eight tons of powder had 
been placed at the end of it, ready to be touched off, 
Just at dawn on July 30th the mine blew up and opened 
a 150-foot crater where the Rebel strong point had been. This 
gave the Federal army a clear shot at Petersburg. 
Trench warfare made offensive movements all but impossible. 
However, the explosion of the mine had suddenly restored open 
warfare again, All Burnside's men had to do was to drive through 
the opening in order to cut Lee's army in half. But the chance 
was lost completely. 
The mine could not have worked better, but the plans for 
exploiting it could not have been worse. Burnside was far to 
the rear, looking on from an artillery emplacement, and the 
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:Tnion trooDs, instead of marching through to the rear of the 
Rebel lines, huddled aimlessly in the crater waiting for new 
orders. This was probably the one chance that was missed during 
the Civil War for which there was no excuse. Grant collliTJ.ented 
bitterly that he had never seen such a wide-open opportunity 
to overwheL~ an entrenched position. As a result of a Court 
of Inquiry which looked into the .failure of this battle General 
Burnside was removed from his command.21 
The war in Virginia now took the appearance of a stale-
mate. Grant had the Rebels pinned down and there was nothing 
to do but wait and extend his lines and improve his .forti.fications. 
Little more took place at Petersburg from the battle o.f the 
Crater until late February 1865. 
As the seige continued in the fall and winter of 1 64- 1 65 
Grant was planning and executing his overall strategy for 
winning the war in the South. His Virginia campaign makes 
little sense unless viewed as a part of the total picture. 
Generals Thomas, Sherman and Sheridan were literally taking 
the South apart a piece at a time while Lee and his powerful 
army were held at bay by Grant and the Army o.f the Potomac. 
Sherman, on his march from Atlanta to the sea, cut the then 
remaining South in two, leaving only the south part of Virginia 
and the Carolinas still in the Confederacy. By February 1st 
Sherman was ready to head north .from Savannah, Georgia, up 
2lcatton, This Hallowed Ground. pp. 333-336. Stribling, 
pp. 238-242. 
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through ~orth and South Carolina to Virginia to help Grant at 
Petersburg and end the war. He did not quite ma.ke it on time, 
as Grant had begun to build up pressure on Lee by mid March. 
The break came at the end of March 1865. Sherman and his 
60,000 veterans were far into North Carolina at the time, still 
a great distance from Petersburg and Richmond. In the line 
around Petersburg things were moving toward a climax and the last 
major ba.ttle of the Civil War--the battle of Five Forks,22 
On April 1, 1865, General Grant 1 s army, led by Sheridan 1 s 
infantry and cavalry, crashed around Lee's right and stood 
astride the last railroad connecting Richmond and the lower 
South. Lee could no longer stay in Petersburg and on April 2nd 
evacuated the town, retreating westward toward the small town 
of Appomattox, the site of a very historic meeting a week later. 
President Lincoln had left Washington on March 23 for City 
Point. His motives for making the trip were numerous, but pri-
marily he wanted to witness the final hour of victory. 
On April '3, after the breakthrough, Lincoln boarded the 
steamer River Queen for the return trip to Washington, As he 
watched City Point slip away he might have been thinking of the 
weary years of defeat--of ~cClellan, ?ope, Burnside, and Hook-
er--or of the hours of final victory and Grant, Sheridan, and 
Sherman. That day John Wilkes Booth registered at the N"ational 
Hotel in Washington,23 
22catton, IT. S. Grant. op. 124--127. Catton, This Eal lowed 
Ground. pp. 330-347, 300-362~ 
231.ralliams, pu. 352, J 54. 
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